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THE CASE OF VALENTIN MOISEYEV

Appeal of V.I.Moiseyev

In connection with the judgment of the Moscow City Court (presiding Kuznetsova N.S.) on the 16th of December, 1999, I consider necessary to state, that conclusions, made in it, in fact repeat completely the indictment. They are incomplete and one-sided, not based on the documents and facts which were investigated and confirmed during the judicial proceedings and which indicate that there are ungrounded conclusions and contradictions in the judgment. It also doesn't take into account received during the judicial proceedings the facts, concerning the documents in the Korean language, which the accusation is based on.

The following points of the judgment are unsupported by evidence and don't correspond to the facts considered during the judicial proceedings.

Working on a long-term mission in Seoul (1992-1994) Moiseyev was involved in covert cooperation by the Republic of Korea (RK) intelligence service (Agency for National Security Planning - ANSP), agreed to such covert cooperation, was included to the ANSP active intelligence personnel and that some assignment was given.

Systematically he has been collecting, retaining and providing documents and information to the Korean intelligence service, doing so also through CSU. Photocopies of official documents containing state secret he kept in his office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) building.

At the same time the ordinary official activity which all the M FA employees are engaged in, such as acquainting with the documents, perceiving oral information, is raised to the rank of espionage - collecting information.

The storage of official documents without secret seal in the office is not forbidden. There was a safe in it for this purpose. All the Korean department files were kept in other offices where there were no safes at all. At the same time in a search record is fixed that in the office there were no any documents of confidential character and furthermore with the secret seal.

In the materials of the Case and judicial proceedings any facts of my providing classified documents and information, which could be fixed in a course of more than 2 years' FSS supervision for our meetings with CSU, are absent. Our conversations didn't exceed the limits of usual discussions of this or that questions. The same conversations me and other officials of the 1 Asian Department of MFA had with other representatives of the Embassy of RK in Moscow. Such an activity is a duty of MFA employees at different levels.

During the judicial proceedings the witness M. also spoke about lack of facts of handing over by me any documents. The witnesses KGB, MLP, TGD spoke about their discussing with the South Koreans a wide sphere of questions concerning the DPRK, Russian-Korean relations and situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Having mentioned that transference supposedly was realized "(among other channels) through CSU", the Court as well as the investigation didn't explain who else could be a receiver. What the most absurd is the conclusion of the Court that "Moiseyev has had a reasonable opportunity to convey the information even during a short-term missions" (how? to whom?) as well as arguments for the benefit of this conclusion (his knowledge of the documents before and after their constituting).

The interpretation of meetings with CSU as contacts with the representative of the RK Embassy in Moscow, having secret meetings with CSU.

It's indisputable that CSU really was a representative of the RK Embassy in Moscow and that's why meetings with him really were meetings with a representative of the Embassy. Those meetings were not secret, as my colleagues knew about them as they testified during the investigation, CSU's drivers as they testified at trial, my family's members.

I never spoke as it's alleged in the judgment that CSU himself fixed place and time of the meetings and the interval between them. As to time and place, the agreements convenient for both sides were always achieved. It's possible to make certain of it just listening to my telephone talks.

As witness MLP testified at trial, the contacts with the representatives of the Embassy were among my direct official duties.

Copies of classified documents supposedly handed over to CSU "Moiseyev made himself by photocopying and kept them in his own office till the moment of handing them over".

Having borrowed this non-proved affirmation from the indictment the Court didn't pay attention to the fact that a few pages back it's said that these copies were taken from the materials of the 1 Asian Department of MFA.

In 1997 having received from CSU an espionage assignment to collect information in the form of a list of documents that were interest to ANSP, Moiseyev produced and then handed over according to the list, copies of 20 classified documents in the form of protocols and agreements on cooperation between RF and DPRK.

Firstly, the list of 8 pages in the Korean language is written rather carelessly (there are repetitions, deletions in it) to be any assignment, there are no marks showing its belonging to a ANSP and interest of ANSP in the protocols and agreements listed there. Secondly, protocols and agreements between the RF and DPRK are not classified documents. Some of them according to the experts opinion were published in the collections and bulletins. Thirdly, some of agreements and protocols mentioned in the list as well as in the indictment do not really exist. I was keeping this list without hiding it. That would be unnatural in the case it was "an espionage assignment". The fact that witness TME didn't confirm that she had given me this list, doesn't automatically mean that I've got it from CSU and handed over him photocopies of some listed there protocols and agreements.

At the same time the Court didn't pay attention to the discrepancy of TME testimony. At trial she stated that she had forgotten the Korean language. At the same time she testimonied that she had studied this long list during interrogation in the investigator's office. She also said that it didn't contain classified protocols and agreements and that it was made on the basis of press.

During interrogation by an investigator she stated that agreements named in the list were familiar to her. At the confrontation she said that probably had seen the list in my office and that protocols and agreements mentioned there were not classified. Thus, it's obvious that this list in the Korean language is familiar to her. But it takes long time and at least it's necessary to know the Korean language to study this list. Besides, she couldn't recollect when she visited the MFA for the last time.

Her statement, that the lecture "The Russian policy on the Korean Peninsula", delivered at the Russian-Korean scientific seminar on the 2nd of July, 1998, was not given for translation into the Korean language as the Institute had no money for this purpose, is not true (the seminar was sponsored by the Koreans who were interested in translation). TME was an organizer of the seminar and this fact is confirmed in the materials of the judicial proceedings. It's natural, that there are my fingerprints on the list as I repeatedly held it in hands before fingerprint examination, including the time when the investigation already conducted.

Receiving during the period 1994-1998 remuneration from the South Korea Intelligence Service, which amounts at least 14.000 US dollars.

It contradicts the affirmation that remuneration of 500 US dollars was given regularly once a month and 2000 $ and 1000 $ were also given. The sums as it's obvious are not comparable. Besides, at trial the witness M. said that not a single fact of receiving money from CSU was fixed for more than 2 years' FSS supervision.

The flat and office search records can not confirm the fact of my receiving money from CSU. Discovered during that searches dollars were earned by me in the foreign missions or got for my participation in the scientific seminars. It was an accumulation of the family and were put by a rainy day. They were at my wife's disposal.

The envelopes are not even mentioned in the flat search record. Witnesses didn't confirm that the envelopes were withdrawn but they appeared in some miracle way. The witness P. said that 300 dollars were taken from my shirt pocket and 152 dollars were taken from my wallet. But during examination only 102 dollars appeared to be out of envelopes.

The absence of any remarks from me or my wife and daughter concerning the discovered during the search dollars is explained by ignorance what remarks should be done in such cases. One should be sure that the overwhelming part of the population of our country doesn't know about them either.

In spite of rigid pressure and threats from the investigators (when I didn't have my defense counsel U.P.Gervis) I always denied any fact of my cooperation with ANSP or any connection with it. At the same time the investigators managed to force me into signing the testimony dictated by them about the documents and money. The Court didn't investigate and verify the facts of psychological pressure upon me and other threats at the beginning of investigation as well as the reasons for delay in affording the defense counsel for me.

As an "objective proof" of my guilt the Court takes a copy of the draft order on reorganization of the operations of ANSP's residency in Moscow for 1997 received from RF Foreign Intelligence Service and a copy of V.I.Moiseyev personnel intelligence casefile. The Court disregarded the fact that a new translation of these documents from the Korean language into Russian made during the judicial proceedings, doesn't contain any mention of their belonging to ANSP and to residency. Moreover, those sheets, marked as a copy of personnel intelligence casefile have no title at all. As witness P. (who originally had translated those sheets) stated that the title was thought by him.

These 11 sheets in the Korean language have no unified numbering. Two of them represent a questionnaire with some of my data. The rest 9 sheets are the list of information about Russian-North Korean relations, received by the South Korean side.

There are about 13 references to me as a source including indication of my name and official position in the list of information. It's excessive in a case when the questionnaire and the list constitute a unit. The fact that these documents were made in various times, in not less than a half of a year break, also indicates that they are separate documents. The fact that about 30% of these items of information were estimated by experts as not authentic proves that I'm not a source of them.

So the Court recognized that I handed over the information mentioned in the list to ANSP through CSU. But the Court hasn't given an answer how it could be done in period from February till September, 1994, when I was in Moscow and CSU was in Seoul, as well as on 26th and 27th of May, 1996, when I was in Pyongyang and CSU was in Moscow. There are the dates of receiving information in the list. The absurdity of it is obvious. However the Court illogically recognized it possible, otherwise it should give a precise answer why all the other items could by referred to me.

As to the copy of the "draft order" for 1997, the witness M. said at trial that this "document" had been made by photocopying and a title page was added to it. The traces of montage are visible on a photocopy.

Besides there are no any references to me or mentioning of my name. The paper says that some person who occupied the position of a senior councilor of the Korean Department was recruited for cooperation. I've never occupied this position. As a councilor I worked in 1990-1992 before leaving for Seoul. Under testimony of witness M., FSS verified me in connection with CSU and found nothing reprehensible.

This time the Court again ignored the fact that in the draft order it is meant a person who occupied the position of the chief of the Korean Department at the period of constituting this document. From September 1996, I didn't occupy this position. The South Koreans knew about my future advancement in April 1996 (that is mentioned in the above mentioned list of items of information about Russian-North Korean relations; the order appeared in February, 1997).

The Court affirms that witnesses IAT, MAI and TGD confirmed they had known about CSU's involvement with ANSP and that they said: "Moiseyev should know about it". But the Court didn't take into account that their knowledge was at the level of rumours and guesses, that they only assume but not affirm that I knew about it. None of the witnesses said that he spoke with me about these assumptions. Witnesses DVI and TME during the investigation said that they didn't know about CSU's involvement with ANSP. Witness M. testified at trial that FSS authentically has found out it only in September 1994, when CSU was officially presented in this quality.

The Court refers to witnesses IAT and TGD testimonies that they had noticed South Koreans good knowledge of the issues they should not know. At the same time the Court doesn't take into account the TGD's testimony that South Koreans still have good knowledge of the issues they should not know. The witnesses KGB and MLP spoke that they informed the South Koreans about new Russian-North Korean state agreement (the witnesses IAT and TGD couldn't know about it).

The information from Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces about my way of life during mission to Seoul contradicts the testimonies of witnesses IAT, TGD, KSA, ELE, who were in Seoul at the same period as me; it also contradicts the flat search record when nothing valuable was found.

As to my contacts with the identified employees of intelligence service in Seoul (according to the information of the Chief Intelligence Directorate and of Counterintelligence Operations Directorate of the Counterintelligence Department) some questions arise, such as whether I knew that they were identified as intelligence service employees, whether such contacts were forbidden, whether they were verified, why this point came to consideration only after instituting of proceedings against me, whom personally I was in touch with. Besides, the only person mentioned as involved with the intelligence service (with whom me and many other Russians were acquainted with) - KCO, the Foreign Intelligence Service and Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces cardinally disagreed in question of his department belonging, occupied position, etc.

As to the classified documents and items of information, which the judgment mentioned as supposedly handed over to CSU, none of them was included in the above mentioned list of information about Russian-North Korean relations. The Court didn't take into account the "List of top secret and secret documents according to registration forms (from MFA) accessible for Moiseyev from March, 1994, till June, 1998".

The Court misunderstood the testimony of witnesses TGD and MLP who said that I have had an access to all MFA official documents. They couldn't and didn't registered all the documents with which I got acquainted. They only meant that there was no limitation for me at that account. It only demonstrates the prejudice of the Court.

According to "The List of top secret and secret documents " I didn't get acquainted with the letter addressed to the RF Ambassador to DPRK (dated 19.09.1996) and couldn't hand over the information contained in it. Besides, it is Russia, that letter is about. But according to a new translation of the document in the Korean language, it says in general about the DPRK's intention to buy Russian-made aircrafts (November, 1994). The information of these intentions can easily be found in Russian, Korean and other countries' mass-media and therefore it can't be considered as a secret information. (It's attached to the materials of the case and the judicial proceedings.)

The expert LPG couldn't clearly explain why the second examination got the same results as the first one when there were made distortions in translation and it was deliberately indicated to DPRK's intention to buy MIG-29 in Russia.

According to a new translation at trial the Russian offer to begin closed negotiations on supply MIG-29 to DPRK is contained in talks record between RF and DPRK deputy ministers of foreign affairs. This record has been got by the South Korean side in August, 1994. But in fact the negotiations when this offer was made, were held only in late September 1994, in Pyongyang.

MFA expert LPG at the interrogation at trial couldn't explain why for examination was taken the talks record between deputy ministers of foreign affairs only for 1994 and, for example, not for the previous years. (In the Korean text the year of the negotiations is not specified). The expert also failed to answer a question why his colleagues came to the conclusion that the talks record can be prepared and handed over before conducting negotiations.

In August, 1994, I had no contacts with CSU.

The MFA experts have proved their conclusions about secrecy not by the normative act but by the department instruction - The List of information, which should be classified in the MFA according to the order dated the 5th of August, 1996, including the items referring to the earlier period. The fact that the experts have examined the documents, which were not specified in the examination assignment decree, once more indicates to the interference in their work.

Expert LPG has recognized that they were given various classified and unclassified documents concerning cooperation between the RF and DPRK in the military area. But "this paper was chosen as it contained secret data".

The experts from the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff motivated their estimate of the considered documents as classified ones by the arguments that those papers contain confidential information about agreements with a foreign country in the intelligence area. However, it's obvious that the document which was considered by experts as the source of the confidential information doesn't contain the agreement itself, only its name.

Not taking into account all these facts the Court has rejected the petition of a new complex expert examination to define the degree of secrecy of the documents and information.

The information about position and approach contained in two drafts state agreements between RF and DPRK. The expert LPG couldn't answer what particular points of the Russian and Korean drafts are confidential. The witnesses KGB, MLP and TGD during interrogation at trial have stated that they do not consider these drafts confidential. They also said they had talked to the South Koreans about the contents of the drafts and discussed the process of the Russian-North Korean consultations on the subject.

A new translation from Korean into Russian of the documents, received by the Counterintelligence Operations Directorate from the Foreign Intelligence Service, was made by a serviceman during the judicial proceedings. There is submission and connection with FSS and Military Procurator General's Office. There are notorious distortions and slips in the translation in order to add an accusatory character to the content. The text has misleading foot-notes and other notes not of philological but semantic character which interpret these or that points of the translation. All that was out of duty of the interpreter.

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